Despite the onset of the current economic crisis there has been no significant move towards protectionism amongst the world's economies. Conventional, rational institutionalist explanations would stress the role played by the constraining rules of the World Trade Organisation, which prevent countries from reneging on their liberalisation commitments without being subject to a powerful dispute settlement mechanism. In this paper, I show that such explanations do not tell the full story as countries have remained open in areas where they have not bound their liberalisation. Instead, I develop a constructivist argument which emphasises how particular ideas about the global trading system have become rooted in policymaking discourse. Trade policymakers have contributed to constructing an ideational imperative for continued openness (and even for concluding the Doha Round) by drawing on a particular reading of economic history (what I refer to as the Smoot-Hawley myth); by continually stressing protectionism's role as one of the causes of the Great Depression non-liberal responses to the current crisis have been all but ruled out.
I. Introduction
The Global Financial Crisis of 2008, and the ensuing economic recession, had a considerable effect on world trade volumes. After almost a decade of practically uninterrupted increases in world merchandise and commercial services exports these peaked in 2008 at respectively $16.1 trillion and $3.8 trillion and subsequently (and dramatically) declined in 2009 to $12.5 trillion and $3.4 trillion (WTO 2012a; see Figure 1 ). This represented a shrinking of global exports of 22.4 per cent for goods and 11.9 per cent for services. What is more significant from a political economy perspective is that this slump in world trade (which has subsequently recovered) has not been accompanied by a significant increase in trade barriers. Tariff levels for the world's leading twenty economies (the so-called Group of G20 [G20] ) have remained fairly stable over the period of the crisis. Similarly, the share of world trade covered by any restrictive measure imposed by the G20 has never exceeded 0.8 per cent since the collapse of the Lehman Brothers investment bank in the autumn of 2008, which heralded the beginning of the global financial meltdown (WTO et al. 2011: 10; WTO 2006 WTO , 2008 WTO , 2009c WTO , 2010c WTO , 2011b .
Source: WTO (2012a).

Figure 1 -World Merchandise and Commercial Services Exports, 2001-2010 (USD trillion at current prices)
This development might surprise those who study trade policy from the perspective of standard public choice models (e.g. Grossman and Helpman 1994; Hiscox 2002) . Such accounts usually involve a pluralist view of state-society relations in which the state is the fighting ground for a large number of competing interests. Due to collective action problems, protectionists are seen here to be more likely to mobilise and shape policy than the 'winners' from liberalisation, due to the concentrated and more immediate nature of the losses incurred and the greater diffusion of the benefits. However, the resilience of free trade following the 2008 Financial Crisis has occurred despite evidence that there has been increased domestic demand for protection (Gawande et al. 2011: 28) . One possible explanation for this state of affairs is offered by what could be termed a 'rational institutionalist' literature in the field of International Political Economy (IPE). This focuses on the role played by the wider global trading 'system'. This argument is that international trading institutions -especially the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and its system of judicialised dispute-settlement -have legally 'locked-in' trade liberalisation, incentivising compliance with global trading rules. This explanation has also been commonly invoked in recent years to justify the conclusion of the current Doha Round of multilateral trade talks. Despite the fact that it promises very little in the way of additional market access, the idea is that Doha would allow for additional policy binding to guard against the threat of protectionism (e.g. Hoekman et al. 2010) .
In this paper I show that such explanations do not tell the full story, as countries have remained open in areas where they have not bound their liberalisation. Instead, I develop a constructivist argument which emphasises how particular ideas about the global trading system have become rooted in policymaking discourse. Trade policymakers and a group of leading economists have contributed to constructing an ideational imperative for continued openness (and even for concluding the Doha Round) by drawing on a particular reading of economic history (what I refer to as the Smoot- Hawley myth); by continually stressing protectionism's role as one of the causes of the Great Depression non-liberal responses to the current crisis have been all but ruled out. My aim in doing so is two-fold. For one, I aim to challenge the dominant discourse about the WTO found in scholarly circles, which uncritically accepts the institution's role in providing the supposed 'public good' of free trade. Secondly, I aim to show how ideas, long neglected in the study of trade decision-making, are crucial determinants of policy outcomes.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section II I review rational instutitionalist explanations of free trade after the crisis, finding that their emphasis on the legally constraining effect of institutions cannot explain why countries did not raise tariffs or non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to trade when they had leeway to do so. In section III, I therefore outline a constructivist account of trade policy which emphasises the importance of discourses of external constraint, in particular the so-called SmootHawley myth. In section IV I then trace how this idea -that the Great Depression was in large part caused and/or exacerbated by protectionism in the 1930s -has been invoked since the collapse of Lehmman brothers in September 2008 by diverse actors within the international trading system (in particular amongst the G20 and within the WTO). This has significantly contributed to rendering a protectionist response to the crisis unthinkable. In section V I then conclude, offering some thoughts on the future of this potential discursive strategy.
II. Free trade after the crisis: looking beyond rationalist explanations
One possible explanation for the resilience of free trade after the crisis is found in the standard neoliberal institutionalist literature that has been written about the WTO in IPE. The theoretical foundations for this approach are taken from Robert Keohane (1984) , whose main point of contention was that international institutions (or 'regimes') could mitigate the effects of international anarchy even in the absence of a hegemon. Thus, Judith Goldstein et al. (2007) underscore how the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its successor, the WTO, have increased trade by emphasising their role in providing 'institutional standing' (i.e. establishing 'rights and obligations', even for non-members) and 'institutional embeddedness' (in other words, the fact that the GATT/WTO are embedded in a wider network of trade agreements and thus have effects beyond their membership). Adding to this literature, Edward Mansfield and Eric Reinhardt (2008) highlight how trade agreements -both preferential and multilateralreduce volatility in international trade flows by committing members to pursuing free trade policies. This, they emphasise, increases trade flows between members of such institutions which 'constrain member-states from introducing new trade barriers [...] [and, among other things,] foster policy transparency and convergence in expectations, standards and policy instruments' (Mansfield and Reinhardt 2008: 622) . The wider IPE literature on the role of international trading institutions similarly emphasises the importance of a rules-based regime in constraining the policy options available to policymakers, particularly in the face of a judicialised dispute settlement mechanism (e.g. Bailey et al. 1997; Howse and Nicolaïdis 2003; Barton et al. 2012) .
1 As Lisa Martin and Beth Simmons (1998: 746) highlight, international institutions 'lock in a particular equilibrium, providing stability'. In this manner, trade regimes are seen to skew the preferences of states towards cooperation by providing an appropriate institutional environment to overcome coordination or time-inconsistency problems (see also Bagwell and Staiger 1999; Maggi and Rodríguez-Clare 1998) and by providing for transparency mechanisms to monitor compliance (Abbott 2000; Collins-Williams and Wolfe 2010) .
Scholars have also applied such arguments to the current context in order to justify the conclusion of the Doha Round of multilateral trading talks, which is widely seen to offer little in the way of additional market access. Thus, economists such as Bernard Hoekman et al. (2010: 505) argue that '[t] he Doha Round must be concluded not because it will produce dramatic liberalisation but because it will create greater security of market access'. Several IPE scholars have agreed with these conclusions, underscoring the importance of concluding the Round as a means of resisting 'murky protectionism' in the form of NTBs which are subject to far less extensive legal constraints than tariffs (Capling and Higgott 2009: 314;  on 'murky protectionism' see Section V; for a similar argument, see also Collins-Williams and Wolfe 2010) . This theme is echoed in a related economic literature which has sought to underscore the value of tariff and policy bindings in reducing trade volatility and trade protection, formalising some of the arguments raised in the IPE literature regarding the importance of international trading institutions. Bindings are seen to both 'constrain the range and variability of protection rates' (Francois and Martin 2004: 676 ; see also Cadot et al. 2008 ) and increase trade flows by providing greater legal certainty to firms engaged in international trade, even where tariffs are bound at rates that far exceed applied tariffswhat is called 'water' in the tariffs or 'binding overhang' (Sala et al. 2010 , as has indeed been the case since the Uruguay Round, see Bchir et al. 2006) . In this vein, one recent econometric study has also concluded that despite binding overhang, tariff binding can have a 'taming' effect on tariffs (Bacchetta and Piermantini 2011) .
2 That being said, such approaches ultimately fall back on the legally constraining role of institutions as explanatory factors. Joseph Francois and Will Martin, for instance, are forced to concede in their conclusion that (2004: 676) they 'characterise trade policy in the presence of a tariff binding as generating uncertain rates of protection subject to the limit imposed by the binding'. In this vein, Marc Bacchetta and Roberta Piermantini's (2011) study finds that the 'taming' effect of tariff bindings decreases with increasing binding overhang.
Here lies the Achilles heel of such approaches when it comes to explaining the current resilience of free trade. As Table 1 highlights, the difference between average applied MFN tariffs and average bound tariffs ('water' or binding overhang) has remained fairly constant for practically all economies that had such wiggle room in the first place over the period of the crisis. Moreover, several countries have had consistently high 'water' levels. In the absence of a multilateral trade agreement, this implies that countries have not made use of the considerable legal wiggle room that they have had to raise tariffs. The absence of comprehensive data on NTBs before the crisis makes it difficult to come to a similarly conclusive argument about their evolution since 2008. However, the evidence here also suggests that there has been no significant increase in measures imposed by states despite considerable legal wiggle room for imposing such measures under the WTO. As noted above, over the period of October 2008 to April 2011 no more than 0.8 per cent of imports into G20 countries were subject to any form of import restriction (WTO et al. 2011) , while data from 2009-11 suggest that there has been no fluctuation in the number of NTBs imposed of a non-fiscal/non-subsidy nature (Gawande et al. 2011: 17) . This challenges the neoliberal institutionalist and economic accounts given above which attribute a legally constraining role to institutions; free trade has been surprisingly resilient despite the (relative) absence of legal constraints. Sources: WTO (2006 WTO ( , 2008b WTO ( , 2009c WTO ( , 2010c WTO ( , 2011b One possible (and still rationalist) explanation for this state of affairs is offered by a group of economists in a study published by the World Bank in October 2011. Noting a similar pattern to that depicted in Table 1 of consistently high 'water' in the tariff rates of a significant number of countries, Kishore Gawande and his colleagues (2011: 28) argue that while institutional constraints have had some effect, the determining factor has been 'the position of domestic and foreign exporters in the global supply chain [...] [which] exert[ed] countervailing pressure against protectionism'. In other words, the increasing degree of vertical specialisation in global production -which has fragmented production chains -has meant that downstream producers and exporters have had the political and economic clout to lobby successfully for continued trade openness against the pressure of import-competing firms. Such an explanation bears some similarity to 'Listian' political economy arguments (e.g. Chang 2002; Wade 2003; Weiss 2005) which would similarly point to country's levels of economic development as correlating with their support for free trade. This fits with Gawande et al.'s (2011) choice of tariff data, which is drawn from seven emerging economies (Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Mexico, Turkey and South Africa) which may well have developed to the point where they see free trade as being in their interest. The problem with such an explanation is that the data compiled in Table 1 suggest that the phenomenon of continued 'high water' levels is not unique to emerging economies that are members of the G20, rather also characterises developing countries at all levels of the spectrum (from LDCs to upper-middle income countries; see Table 1 ). This conundrum is underscored by the fact that Gawande et al's (2011) Rather, what the findings in this section suggest is that we need to look beyond such rationalist explanations to understand the nature of the global trading system. My theoretical argument in this paper is that they neglect the important dimension of ideas.
III. Deconstructing trade discourse: the bicycle metaphor and the Smoot-Hawley myth
In this vein, my aim in this section is to map out a constructivist alternative to explaining the resilience of free trade after the crisis, pointing to the important role of ideas in structuring social reality. Using the term constructivism inevitably evokes a tradition in IR theory mostly associated with the writings of Alexander Wendt (1999) or John Ruggie (1982) . Indeed, scholars have recently sought to reconceptualise the international trade regime in terms of an 'intersubjective communication among participants' (Wolfe 2005: 340 ; see also Lang 2006 Lang , 2007 . But such approaches, while adding an ideational 'layer' to neoliberal institutionalism, are still caught up in IR constructivism's excessive emphasis on international institutions -'the trade regime' says Lang (2006: 85) 'does not regulate actor behaviour, it also partly constitutes it' -and neorealist-inspired state-centrism (for a similar critique of IR constructivism, see Parsons 2007 ). As such, it is still caught up in the puzzle that the post-crisis resilience of free trade poses for 'regime-based' approaches in IPE.
My aim here, therefore, is to recast constructivism as a framework that takes on the role of agency. This is based on an intuitive and persuasive ontological position, which has informed a growing literature in IPE: the belief that social and political reality is constructed by agents through ideas rather than being fixed by particular material (or what could be called 'structural') constraints, as in rationalist accounts. In this vein, I contend that a powerful reason why ideas matter in the international political economy is that they are treated by actors as though they were material straightjackets. The argument is that neoliberal tenets are increasingly treated as 'normalised', that is, as reflections of a reality in which the rational homo economicus is the main determinant of social outcomes, rather than as a 'normative' framework, advocating policies seen as desirable (Hay 2004) . In contrast, the key point I wish to stress at this juncture, in keeping with my constructivist ontology, is that the rational-actor assumptions neoclassical economic models are premised on are ultimately constructed and contingent, rather than given and fixed. As Charles Maier (1988: 4-6) , puts it (critical) political economy 'interrogates economic doctrines to disclose their sociological and political premises... in sum, [it] regards economic ideas and behaviour not as frameworks for analysis, but as beliefs and actions that must themselves be explained.'
This suggests that it may be fruitful to consider a literature that has concerned itself with the discursive construction of globalisation as such an economic constraint. This takes as its point of departure the debate between advocates of the 'hyperglobalisation thesis' and its skeptics. Rather than accepting the parameters of this rationalist argument -that is to say, entering into a debate over whether globalisation is an empirically verifiable material process that restricts the choices facing political actors -such writers adopt the constructivist view that it is the ideas that agents hold (and invoke) about 'globalisation' that are key (see, among others, Rosamond 1999 Rosamond , 2002 Hay and Rosamond 2002; Hay and Smith 2010; Watson and Hay 2003) . In a seminal article, Colin Hay and Ben Rosamond (2002: 148, emphasis in the original) quite effectively condense the central argument of this approach, noting that 'policymakers acting on the basis of assumptions consistent with the hyperglobalisation thesis may well serve, in so doing, to bring about outcomes consistent with that thesis, irrespective of its veracity and, indeed, irrespective of its perceived veracity.' The perceived material rationality of the hyperglobalisation thesis becomes meaningful in shaping outcomes only because it is internalised by actors, in other words, because it is treated by them as though it were a real, material constraint rather than just a (contestable) economic framework. The key to understanding this process is a study of what this literature terms 'globalisation discourse', tapping into a very Foucauldian understanding of knowledge. Here discourse is defined as 'a broad[…] matrix of social practices that gives meaning to the way that people understand themselves and their behaviour.
[…] More precisely, a discourse makes "real" that which it prescribes as meaningful' (George 1994: 29-30 , emphasis in the original). Analysing discourse thus becomes the study of the process of social construction, focusing on the nexus between power and knowledge. Such a framework problematises economistic understandings of IPE in the sense implied by Maier (1988) above. It also stresses the fact that power is being exercised when such discourses are invoked, borrowing from the critical approach of Robert Cox (1981) . The power of such rhetorics thus resides in that they present a (politically) contingent phenomenon as immutable (economic) fact.
Whereas much work on discourses of economic constraint has focused on the invocation of current processes as constraining policy choices -e.g. globalisation or indeed the necessity to meet competitiveness objectives (see also Siles-Brügge 2011; Menz 2009 ) -what is interesting in the case of trade policy is that similar discourses have often had a historical dimension. In other words, rather than just stressing the inevitability of contemporaneous process, such discourses have drawn on a contestable historical interpretation to draw an analogy to the present. One such discourse is perhaps first highlighted by Susan Strange (1985: esp. 239-42) , who seeks to expose it as a 'myth'. This is the idea, common among liberal economists and scholars of IPE, that the global Great Depression of the 1930s was, if not caused by trade protection, certainly exacerbated by it as countries short-sightedly pursued 'beggar-thy-neighbour' policies. These, so the conventional argument, led to a significant decline in world trade in manufactures with dire consequences for the global economy. This could be termed the 'Smoot-Hawley myth', in 'honour' of the two US legislators who attached their names to the infamous protectionist bill passed by the Congress in 1930. Strange challenges this myth by invoking the evidence collected by several economic historians, arguing that the collapse of world trade and the rise of protectionism was symptomatic rather than a cause of worldwide economic collapse. To this effect she cites not only the perhaps more heterodox development economist Arthur Lewis (1949) but also one of the doyens of the realist school of IPE Charles Kindleberger (1973) , both of whom argued that tariffs had a 'minimal' effect on 'the volume of world trade or to its direction' (Strange 1985: 239-40) . One other influential (albeit ahistorical) 'myth' that Strange (1985: 241-2) tackles is what she refers to as the 'bicycle theory', the idea that 'if you do not keep up the momentum of trade liberalization [of multilateral trade rounds], disaster will follow'.
This particular discourse has also been critiqued more recently by Rorden Wilkinson (2009 Wilkinson ( , 2012 , although he uses the term 'metaphor' to convey the manner in which such ideas are used to inculcate a discursive 'common sense'. Wilkinson's aim, not unlike Strange's, is to expose this metaphor as false. But more importantly than that, he also seeks to explore 'the way in which the discourse has been deployed as a means of reframing trade negotiations in such a way that the likelihood of their continuation and ultimate conclusion increases' (Wilkinson 2009: 597) . These ideas are thus powerful instruments used by trade policymaking elites -in particular those with close ties to the US -in order to further their interest in concluding the Doha Round of multilateral trade talks. Although Strange (1985: 234) also acknowledges a strategic dimension in her discussion of 'crisis discourse' -in that it serves those with a 'vested professional or ideological interest in it' to warn of its imminent collapse -her underlying argument is that 'the system of rules which people (still, alas) refer to as a regime is of little moment'. The Smoot-Hawley myth and the bicycle theory, in her views, are red herrings, which distract from the underlying features of the global political economy. In this paper, unsurprisingly, however, I take a view closer to Wilkinson's approach in highlighting the power that such ideas hold, whether we see them as instruments or repositories of political power (i.e. whether we take a view of discourse as, respectively, 'strategic' or 'reflexive').
From the discussion above, we arrive at two particular discourses that may be of particular relevance today in legitimating free trade outcomes in the face of protectionist pressures: the Smoot-Hawley myth -which attributes the cause of the Great Depression to trade protectionism -and the bicycle metaphor -which argues that sustained multilateral liberalisation is necessary to avoid a descent into protectionism. To a large extent both discourses are, of course, entwined. Indeed, the argument expounded in the conventional economic/IPE literature on value of concluding the Doha Round in terms of its ability to bind current levels of trade openness in the context of an economic recession (e.g. Hoekman et al. 2010) clearly resonates on both counts. Wilkinson (2009: 602-6 ) indeed writes of a 'crisis discourse' which underpins the bicycle metaphortaking hold during the postwar period -and which drew on the memory of SmootHawley to spur liberalisation against domestic and international pressure.
In this paper, however, I choose to differentiate between both for two interrelated reasons. From a more abstract, analytical perspective it makes sense to draw distinctions between both discourses as they have served different functions and have originated in different discursive contexts (depending on whether they are seen to take a 'reflexive' or 'strategic' dimension). Thus, the Smoot-Hawley myth had its origins in the immediate aftermath of the Great Depression in US trade policymaking circles; as Goldstein (1988: 187) notes of this myth, which she herself accepts as fact, '[t] he failure of the Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1929-30 to deal with economic decline set up a policymaking crisis. The delegitimization of protectionism forced the political community to search for an alternative theoretical approach to explain past errors and provide guidelines for future behavior'. The bicycle metaphor, for its part, had its origins in the 1970s 'after serious impediments to further liberalization began to emerge' in the form of an increasingly intricate GATT and negotiating agenda, and given the economic crises of the period (Wilkinson 2009: 605) . Secondly, and applying this analytical insight to the puzzle at hand -why free trade has been so resilient in the wake of the crisis -it makes sense in this paper to focus on the latter form of discourse. Indeed, the fact that protectionism has not been brought about despite the advent of the crisis and despite the stagnation of the Doha Round -bicycle metaphor notwithstanding -suggest why this latter discourse may be more prevalent (see also Wilkinson 2012: 4). My aim in this paper is thus to map the Smoot-Hawley myth in contemporary discussions of trade policy and to begin to consider its wider effect on participants in international trade discussions. Clearly, this raises questions as to whether such discourses are being invoked strategically or simply being internalised by actors, as this has some bearing on the nature of ideas (in other words, they may be either instruments used to exercise power or repositories of power, or both). This is beset by what Hay and Rosamond (2002: 165) term and 'inherent' and 'intractable' dilemma in the study of public discourses. The problem, in a nutshell, is that one cannot determine from an actor's pronouncement per se whether a particular idea is being invoked strategically, as they could be simply repeating an idea they have internalised (without any ulterior motive). Whereas some authors have carried out in-depth empirical work to determine the strategic nature of such uses of discourse (e.g. Hay and Smith 2010; Siles-Brügge 2011) , this is unfortunately beyond the scope of this paper (although this is clearly what should be studied in future research). Moreover, it is clear that the idea itself has had an effect on the behaviour of actors (what I refer to above as the 'reflexive' dimension to discourse) even if we cannot -at least at this stage -entirely disentangle this from the 'strategic' invocation of such ideas. Similarly, whereas there is no space here to fully deconstruct this myth and to challenge the validity of its historical interpretation -although Strange and Wilkinson suggest there are clear grounds for doing so -the term is still apt to describe this discourse for two reasons. Firstly, it conveys the quasireligious character of the idea in trade policymaking circles, where it remains unchallenged. For another, the idea has shown considerable endurance, having originally taken shape in the mid-1930s. As a result, the using the term myth serves to highlight the power that this particular idea ultimately holds in the international trading system.
IV. The Smoot-Hawley myth in action (2008-2012)
The Smooth-Hawley myth has played a key role in legitimating free trade policies following the Financial Crisis, with near universal acceptance among leading world economic decision-makers in the G20 and WTO. What is interesting is that prior to the crisis, such actors invoked very different ideas about the multilateral trading system. The discourse, however, was to change among policymakers, especially following the collapse of the Lehman Brothers investment bank -widely seen to be the point at which the brewing subprime mortgage crisis in the US escalated to become a worldwide financial meltdown (Germain 2010: 70-72) . Among the G20, metaphorical alarm bells were rung as early as November 2008 (only two months after the collapse of Lehman) when the leaders of the world's leading economies 4 met for their first summit in Washington, DC. Among the issues on the agenda was the issue of 'committing to an open global economy'. The final summit communiqué was very explicit in this regard, with G20 members underscor[ing] the critical importance of rejecting protectionism and not turning inward in times of financial uncertainty. In this regard, within the next 12 months, we will refrain from raising new barriers to investment or to trade in goods and services, imposing new export restrictions, or implementing World Trade Organization (WTO) inconsistent measures to stimulate exports (G20 2008).
This statement is quite significant for two reasons. First of all, rejecting protectionism was argued to be of 'critical importance [...] in times of financial uncertainty', clearly echoing the experience Great Depression of the 1930s, which itself had roots in the financial turmoil experienced at the time. In this vein, Table 3 shows how the SmootHawley discourse has become a common feature of G20 summit declarations. There has been at least an implicit reference to protectionism in the context of the Depression in most, if not all of the leaders' communiqués. Moreover, some of the references have been quite explicit. Thus, at the London summit, leaders agreed that they '[would] not repeat the historic mistakes of protectionism' (G20 2009a). Secondly, the excerpt from the Washington summit communiqué cited above contained a formal commitment from policymakers -from practically from the beginning of the worldwide economic recession we should not forget -to not implement new trade barriers. This 'standstill pledge' would be extended until the end of 2010 at the London G20 summit in April 2009. It was then reaffirmed at Pittsburgh (in September 2009) and subsequently extended until the end of 2013 at Toronto (in June 2010), with the latter pledge being reaffirmed at Seoul (in November 2010) and Cannes (in November 2011). Moreover, at London it was expanded to include a commitment to 'rollback': G20 members pledged to 'rectify promptly any such measures' that they imposed (G20 2009a).
What is interesting about this pledge is that, at first sight, it would appear to substantiate an institutionalist argument about the resilience of free trade. Not only was this pledge a form of international cooperation but it also entailed a quasi-legal pre-commitment to liberal trade policies that was to be monitored by the WTO (as agreed at the London G20 summit). However, although Terry Collins-Williams and Robert Wolfe (2010: 551) credit this '[e]nhanced monitoring and surveillance of emergency measures [as] […] central to the international effort to mitigate the effects of the financial crisis', their own paper reports that the WTO's overall monitoring record is patchy at best. This is, in large part, due to the reliance on self-reporting, with only those bodies within the WTO having clearly defined reporting arrangements yielding promising outcomes (CollinsWilliams and Wolfe 2011: 572-4) . This problem also besets the specific reporting arrangements for the G20 pedge, as they are governed by nothing more than a pledge to 'notify promptly the WTO of any such measures' (G20 2009a). Indeed, CollinsWilliams and Wolfe (2011: 577) note that these reports 'are hampered by the failure of governments to notify more'. In this paper I therefore suggest that what matters is not so much the quasi-legal pledge itself, and its role in shaping the rational expectations of actors, but rather the discursive context of which it is symptomatic, where free trade is seen as the only possible response to the crisis.
Illustrative of this interpretation is the case of Argentina, which has (since 2008) increasingly made use of non-automatic import licensing in an effort to address a falling trade surplus. Although this has featured in previous WTO reports on the G20 antiprotectionism pledge (e.g. WTO et al. 2010: 35; WTO et al. 2011: 50) , the policy has persisted. In this vein, in January 2012 it also introduced a policy of requiring companies to file affidavits for prior import authorisation by the government, with the issuing of such permits being delayed. When these policies, however, were roundly condemned in a statement issued by 14 WTO delegations (including the US, EU, Japan, Mexico, Thailand, Turkey and a number of other G20 delegations) in April, Argentina did make significant moves to facilitate the issuing of such licenses (ICTSD 2012) . In their statement, these delegations had highlighted that '[i]n light of the shared goal of making every effort to sustain global economic growth, Argentina's measures, which clearly limit the growth-enhancing prospects of trade, are particularly troubling ' (cited in ICTSD 2012) . Although there were clearly material factors at stake -in that Argentina may have feared retaliation from such states if it did not relax its import policy -the fact remains that such statements appear to have gained considerable legitimacy (as, indeed, they were widely endorsed) by appealing to a shared 'Recognizing the importance of free trade and investment for global recovery, we are committed to keeping markets open and liberalizing trade and investment as a means to promote economic progress for all and narrow the development gap. The importance of free trade and open markets is illustrated by the joint report of the OECD, ILO, World Bank and WTO on the benefits of trade liberalization for employment and growth. These trade and investment liberalization measures will help achieve the G20 Framework objectives for strong, sustainable and balanced growth, and must be complemented by our unwavering commitment to resist protectionism in all its forms.'
Cannes (November 2011)
'Avoiding Protectionism and Reinforcing the Multilateral Trading System' 'At this critical time for the global economy, it is important to underscore the merits of the multilateral trading system as a way to avoid protectionism and not turn inward.'
Sources: G20 (2008, 2009a,b, 2010a, b, 2011). narrative about the ultimate necessity of free trade (with the Smoot-Hawley myth lurking in the background). This exercise of publicly 'naming and shaming' Argentina was thus far more effective than the institutionalised procedures of the WTO, pointing to the importance of communicative discursive practice over institutional incentives.
The G20 summits have been perhaps the most high profile instance of the prevalence (and potentially, use) of this discourse among trade policymaking circles. However, it is also commonplace in the statements of key WTO figures, first and foremost among them, the Director-General Pascal Lamy. As noted above, prior to the economic crisis, Lamy's speeches tended to feature the 'bicycle' metaphor. Following the collapse of Lehman brothers in September 2008, Lamy was to make a series of four speeches in quick succession (24 September, 27 October, 29 October and 3 November) in which he explicitly invoked the 'Smoot-Hawley' myth (Lamy 2008a,b,c,d September Lamy (2008a) , addressing the WTO Public Forum, was to stress that 'one of the important lessons of the Great Depression, which we must not forget, is that "protectionism" and economic isolationism do not work'. On 27 October, the reference to the Smoot-Hawley myth was even more explicit in a speech Lamy was to give at Stanford University:
The notorious Smoot-Hawley Act sharply raised already high US tariffs, triggered retaliatory measures by trading partners and led to a two-thirds contraction in the value of global trade. This trade contraction deepened the Great Depression which pushed the US jobless rate to 25%. It also shaped the thinking of the visionaries who created the post-World War II system of multilateralism. Never again would the world lurch toward blinkered beggar- thy-neighbour trade policies that did so much to destabilise the world in the 1930s (Lamy 2008b WTO 2008a) . Several delegations also turned out to be keen to endorse the standstill and rollback commitments of the G20. At the May 2009 General Council meeting of the WTO a number of members -largely from non-G20 developed and emerging economies -called on their fellow WTO members to also take on the G20 commitments, invoking the spectre of the Great Depression to legitimate their policy prescription (WTO 2009a) . 5 In the subsequent discussion within the General Council, the initiative was widely welcomed with current G20 members and the Least Developed Country group (led by Tanzania), among others, stressing the importance of continued rejection of protectionism on the grounds that this threatened the recovery (WTO 2009b). 6 At an even lower level of policymaking, the trade policy review process of the WTOwhose aim is to review the trade policies of WTO members for consistency with WTO rules and principles -has been the venue for the consistent repetition of this myth by delegations of both developed and developing nations. For instance, in reviewing the EU's trade policy response to the crisis in September 2011, the St Lucian delegation was echoing the sentiments of very many other delegations when it highlighted that 'the difficult lessons of the great depression have been learnt and that the EU has not engaged in wholesale tit-for-tat protectionism' (WTO 2011a: 53; see also WTO 2010a: 17; WTO 2010b: 1). Although the St Lucian delegation went on to subsequently criticise the EU for its system of agricultural subsidies under the Common Agricultural Policy (as did indeed other developing countries), this does not detract from the argument that the Smoot-Hawley discourse appears to be strongly embedded in trade policymakers discourse when discussing the recent crisis. Thus, even though the Trade Policy Review process has often been derided by participants as largely a 'talking shop' 7 -simply leading to the reproduction of rehearsed policy positions and beset by the more general problem's of WTO surveillance mechanisms (Collins-Williams and Wolfe 2010) -the fact remains that it is a venue for the repetition of a discourse of considerable staying power and near universal acceptance.
V. Conclusion
In this paper I began with a puzzle, how to explain the resilience of free trade despite the onset of the 2008 Financial Crisis. I then challenged the dominant, rational institutionalist account of mainstream IPE scholars and economists, who (in large part) argued that the resilience of free trade is a product of the constraining role of the global trading regime largely embodied by the WTO. My argument was that it made little sense to point to policy 'lock-in' when many leading economies have had considerable legal leeway to raise tariffs and NTBs and have not done so. In contrast, I made a constructivist argument that pointed to the important role played by ideas, as articulated by distinct actors, in structuring social reality -in particular so-called discourses of external constraint. I focused on the role of the so-called Smoot-Hawley myth -the idea that the Great Depression was caused and/or exacerbated by global protectionism in the 1930s that had been initiated in the US -in ruling out any non-liberal response to the Global Financial Crisis among trade policymaking elites (especially among the G20 and within the WTO).
The conclusions I have reached in this paper are still tentative and naturally still in need of further refinement. However, I have been able to deconstruct this discourse -and the idea in scholarly circles that it is largely the institutional mechanisms of the WTO which guarded against protectionist pressures. In this vein, I have been able to advance the cause of those who argue that we need to take ideas more seriously in the study of the international trading system without necessarily subscribing to a form of IR-based constructivism (e.g. Wilkinson 2009 ). Indeed, ideas-based explanations may also hold the key to understanding the future of the international trading system in a world where austerity and economic pain are widespread of the landscape in much of the industrialised world. Selling free trade to the public may, after all, be a more contingent proposition if the crisis continues biting. Future research is thus paramount if we are to understand the full scope and limitations of this process of discursive legitimation.
